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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

JAMES H. HUPP,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16603

HON. S. MARK JOHNSON,
Judge of the Circuit Court,
State of Utah, Davis County,
Bountiful Department,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner petitioned the District Court for an
Extraordinary Writ prohibiting the defendant from further
proceedings under a criminal complaint charging petitioner
with the offense of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, and ordering the Circuit Court to
dismiss the charge.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court, after hearing arguments of counsel
on the 19th day of July, 1979, found that the offenses
with which petitioner was charged were all separate offenses,
did not constitute a single criminal episode, and denied
the Petition.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the Order of the District Court denying the
Petition be reversed, the Petition granted, and an Order
issued prohibiting further proceedings by the Circuit
Court and ordering said Circuit Court to dismiss the
charge against the petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner was arrested on the 5th day of January,
1979, at approximately 1:50 a.m., and thereafter was
charged by separate ticket complaints with the following
offenses:

driving under the influence of alcohol (Summons

& Complaint No. A09208-R9); driving with an expired Utah
driver's license (Summons & Complaint No. A09209-Rl0);
driving with an expired Utah state vehicle registration
(Summons & Complaint No. A09210-Rll); and driving with
expired Utah state vehicle inspection (Summons & Complaint
No. A09211-Rl2).
Thereafter, within the time specified in said Summons
and Complaints, petitioner appeared in the Davis County
Circuit Court, Bountiful Department, and entered pleas of
guilty to three of the offenses, to wit:

driving with an

expired Utah driver's license, driving with an expired
Utah state vehicle registration, and driving with an
expired Utah state vehicle inspection; which said pleas
were accepted by the Court, and petitioner was sentenced
therefor.

Petitioner also entered a plea of not guilty to
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the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Thereafter, on the 22nd day of May, 1979, petitioner
was charged in a formal Complaint with driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor on the 5th day of January,
1979.

Trial having been set for that date, petitioner

appeared through counsel, and moved the Court to dismiss
the charge on the grounds and for the reason that prosecution was barred under the provisions of 76-1-403
1953 as amended.
The Court denied this said Motion, and also of a
Motion for Continuance, proceeded to try petitioner in
absentia, found petitioner guilty of the charge, and set
a date for sentencing.

Petitioner, on the 29th day of

May, 1979, filed his Verified Petition in the District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFENSES INVOLVED HEREIN CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE," AND ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF 76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, AS AMElmED.

A.

All Charges Grew Out of a "Single Criminal Episode."
76-1-401 U.C.A., 1953, as aIP.ended, defines a ;'single

criminal episode" as
. all conduct which is closely related in time
and is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, and State v. Ireland,
570 P.2d 1206, the Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the
test to be applied in determining the existence of a
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"single criminal episode" includes closeness in time and
singleness of criminal objective.
The offenses with which petitioner was charged all
involved the same act of driving, and were not only close
in time but occurred simultaneously, which completely
satisfies the "closely related in time" provision of
76-1-401 u.c.A., 1953, as amended.
All of the offenses with which petitioner was
charged require, as an essential element, the driving of
the vehicle.

In this instance, the charges before the

Court alleged that petitioner's vehicle was operated in
Davis County on January 5, 1979, at 0150 hours [it is to
be noted that the original Summons & Complaint charged the
offense of driving under the influence of alcohol on
5 December 1979.

However, in the formal Complaint, this

was changed to driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor on January 5, 1979 (R-9 and R-13)).
Thus, at the time of his arrest, petitioner was operating
his vehicle with a "single criminal objective," i.e., to
operate said vehicle illegally.

"Criminal objective" is

to be defined in terms of the act by which the law is
broken.

In this case, it was the petitioner's objective

to perform the act of driving a vehicle illegally.
counts stern from this single act.

All

Further, none of the

offenses herein charged is illegal until such time as it
is combined with the driving of a vehicle.

Because all

charges occurred simultaneously and grew out of a single
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criminal objective, they comprise a "single criminal
episode" under 76-1-401 U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
B.

Petitioner Is Entitled To The Protection Of The
Statutory Bars Raised By 76-1-402 and 76-1-403,
U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
76-1-402 (1) and (2) (a) (b) U.C.A., 1953, as amended,

provide:
76-1-402.
Separate offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode.--(1) A defendant may be prosecuted
in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however,
when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may
be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars
a prosecution under any other such provision.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
(2)
Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, and
(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Under the above provisions of 76-1-402(1), a defendant shall
be punished only under one such provision where the same
act of the defendant is punishable under different provisions.
In this instance, the only illegal and criminal act of the
petitioner was the one instance of the driving of his
vehicle, and since he has already been convicted and sentenced under three other statutory provisions for this one
act, his prosecution under 41-6-44 U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
on a charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the
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influence of intoxicating liquors, is barred.
With regard to 76-1-402(2), the offenses with which
the petitioner was charged were all Class B misdemeanors,
and are within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court,
the necessity for which was pointed out in the case of
State v. Sosa, #15929, filed July 5, 1979.

Also see

State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693.
Further, since all of the offenses were committed
simultaneously, in the presence of the arresting officer,
were all known to the Court at the time of petitioner's
original appearance, and since the prosecuting attorney
is an officer of the Court, it would appear that the
requirement that the offenses be known to the prosecuting
attorney has been satisfied (T-6).

Any other conclusion

would result in a prosecuting attorney being able to
thwart the legislative intent in the passage of a statute
merely by shirking his duties and professing ignorance.
At the very least, the prosecuting attorney in this matter
should be presumed to know of the offenses, or in the
alternative estopped to deny that which is common knowledge
to the police and the Court, and which it is his duty to
know.
76-1-403 (1) (a) and (b) (ii) U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
provide:
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense out of same episode.-(!)
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one
or more offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or
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a different offense arising out of the same criminal
episode is barred if:
(Emphasis added.)
(a)
The subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried under section
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and

* * *
(ii)

Resulted in conviction . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

76-1-403(3) defines the term "conviction" as follows:
(3)
There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed,
set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; or a plea of
guilty accepted by the court.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case the pleas of guilty were not only accepted by
the court but the petitioner was sentenced on the charges.
The District Court apparently based its denial of the
Petition on the finding that the offenses with which
petitioner was charged were all separate offenses, and
therefore did not constitute a single criminal episode (R-15
and T-8).

This result appears to confuse the distinction

between "double jeopardy," which precludes the subsequent
trial of a defendant for the same offense if he has been
previously tried therefor, with the statutory bar granted
by the legislature in 76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, which repeatedly refers to separate or multiple
offenses.

(See State v. Sosa, supra.)

The purpose of the statute is separate and distinct
from the protection afforded by the "double jeopardy" clause,
in that it bars a multiplicity of trials where the various
offenses could and should have been tried in a single trial
in a single court, as is the case in this instance.
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While the offenses charged here are not included in
the Utah Criminal Code, it is apparent that 76-1-103 U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, makes the provisions of the Utah Criminal
Code govern prosecutions under any offenses outside the
Criminal Code and would thus include the Title 41, u.c.A.,
1953, as amended, violations with which petitioner was
charged.

CONCLUSION
It is clear in this case that all of the offenses
involving the petitioner occurred simultaneously, and
involved the same illegal and criminal act, to wit;

the

driving of a vehicle; which said illegal criminal driving of
the vehicle is the sole criminal objective of all of the
offenses, and thus constitutes a single criminal episode.
Since all of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors,
they are clearly within the trial jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court, and could and should have been tried
simultaneously.
All of the offenses were indisputably known to the
arresting officer, and the Court, at the time petitioner
appeared and entered his pleas.

The offhand claim of the

prosecuting attorney of a lack of knowledge of the offense
appears to be without substance, and is at best a futile
attempt to thwart the operation of the statutory bar (T-6).
The petitioner, having entered a plea of and having
been found guilty and sentenced on three of the offenses,
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is clearly entitled to the statutory bar contained in
76-1-401 (et seq.) U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
For these reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests
the Court to grant his petition and issue its Order
prohibiting the Circuit Court from proceeding further with
the charge against him, and further ordering said Court
to dismiss said charge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

:J~

dayo~

1979.

~~
Attorney for PetitionerAppellant
516 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING~
I certify that on the
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day
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of~
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~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

